Cooperatives and family businesses by Chatzivgeri, E. et al.
WestminsterResearch
http://www.westminster.ac.uk/westminsterresearch
 
Cooperatives and family businesses
Chatzivgeri, E., Paterson, A, Paterson, S. and Wilson, M.
 
This is copy of a book chapter published in Paterson, A., Yonekura, A., Jackson, W. and 
Jubb, D. (eds.) Contemporary Issues in Social Accounting, Goodfellow Publishers.  It is 
included here with permission of the publisher, and further distribution is not permitted.
The WestminsterResearch online digital archive at the University of Westminster aims to make the 
research output of the University available to a wider audience. Copyright and Moral Rights remain 
with the authors and/or copyright owners.
Whilst further distribution of specific materials from within this archive is forbidden, you may freely 
distribute the URL of WestminsterResearch: ((http://westminsterresearch.wmin.ac.uk/).
In case of abuse or copyright appearing without permission e-mail repository@westminster.ac.uk
Chapter taken from Contemporary Issues in Social Accounting. Goodfellow Publishers. ISBN 9781911396574  
for sole use of University of Westminster Repository
 10 Cooperatives and 
Family Businesses
Audrey Paterson, Sebastian Paterson,    
Eleni Chatzivgeri and Melanie Wilson
Introduction
So far within this book we have considered social accounting within the private, 
public and third sectors and have explored related concepts and their growing 
momentum in the drive towards increased organisational and social accountabil-
ity. In this chapter, we consider two further economic sectors, namely coopera-
tives and family businesses. Cooperatives and family businesses vary in size and 
skill and cover a diverse variety of activities ranging from healthcare, social care, 
and housing to sustainable agricultural and renewable energy sources. Currently 
in the UK, there are nearly 7,000 independent cooperatives, contributing £36bn to 
the UK economy. Cooperatives differ from public and private businesses, which 
exist to produce goods or services in the public interest or to maximise the profits 
of their owners, respectively. In contrast to public and private companies, the 
main purpose of a cooperative is the advancement of its members and not the 
pursuit of public interest or economic gain.
We are, of course, familiar with the profit seeking motives of private business 
and the social motives of public sector organisations, but cooperatives do not fit 
well into either of these conceptions due to their hybrid function, which seeks to 
satisfy both social and economic objectives (Fairbairn 1994). 
Governance describes a firm’s system of decision-making, direction and 
control. In the case of cooperatives, effective accountability and governance 
depends on the pro-active participation of its members. It is recognised that just 
as traditional businesses, cooperatives should make sure they comply with the 
accounting as well as the legislative regulations (Jenkins, 2008; Campbell, 2003), 
and that attention is paid to the level of training of the cooperative board along 
with their quality (Campbell, 2004) as well as the board’s ability to look after 
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the interests of both the cooperatives members and other stakeholders (Cross 
and Buccola, 2004). Moreover, the board, and the executive team for which it is 
responsible, directly impact the value proposition that determine members’ and 
other stakeholders’ willingness to engage with the cooperative business.
While cooperatives provide a significant contribution to the economy, a large 
proportion of the UK’s economy is also supported by family businesses. Indeed, 
it is estimated that family businesses account for almost 25% of the UK’s gross 
domestic product (GDP). As such these two areas are of increasing importance 
when considering the accountability and governance responsibilities of organisa-
tions. With new questions arising every day to challenge the contributions that 
cooperatives and family businesses make to our communities, it is essential that 
we have the tools to clearly demonstrate their worth. Likewise, given the impor-
tance of the role boards play in the success or failure of cooperative organisations 
and family businesses, and the importance of these organisations in the wider 
economy, it is prudent to develop some knowledge and understanding of the 
complexities of the way in which these boards are structured and the role that 
they play in achieving accountability and governance within their organisation.
In this chapter, we consider the following: who governs; board roles and board 
relationships with management; board size and director selection processes; the 
importance of board members’ participation; and the input of managers in rela-
tion to accountability and governance in these two sectors. The chapter begins 
with a short overview of the evolution of cooperatives and what constitutes a 
family business. This is followed by a discussion of the organisational model and 
governance structures and their effectiveness. 
The cooperative movement – evolution and aims
Notwithstanding a recent claim that the origin of the cooperative movement 
began in 1761 with the creation of the Fenwick Weavers Society in Ayrshire, 
Scotland and its subsequent formation of a consumer cooperative in 1769 (Carrell, 
2007; McFadzean, 2008), the cooperative business model is generally held to have 
begun amongst grassroot organisations in Western Europe, North America and 
Japan in the middle of the 18th century. The prototype of the modern cooperative 
society is commonly considered to be a group of northern English artisans called 
the Rochdale Pioneers, who opened a store in 1844 (Lambert, 1968). Working in 
the cotton mills of Rochdale in the 1840s and unable to afford the high prices of 
food and household goods, they pooled their resources to access basic goods at a 
lower price. Their enterprise was founded upon the belief that shoppers should 
be treated with honesty and respect, that they should have a share in the profits 
and that they should have a democratic right to have a say in the business. Every 
customer of the shop became a member and thus had a stake in the business.
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The International Cooperative Alliance (ICA) recognises that the founda-
tions upon which the Rochdale Pioneers created their business still underpin 
modern cooperative enterprises today (ICA). The ICA defines a cooperative as 
“an autonomous association of persons united voluntarily to meet their common 
economic, social, and cultural needs and aspirations through a jointly-owned 
and democratically-controlled enterprise” (ICA, 2015). The seven internation-
ally recognised cooperative principles are: voluntary and open membership; 
democratic member control; member economic participation; autonomy and 
independence; provision of education; training and information; cooperation 
among cooperatives, and concern for the community (ICA, 2015). Considering 
the underpinning principles, cooperative enterprises cannot fit into the current 
organisational models and are often regarded as unique business models. This is 
largely because they do not only serve an economic purpose, but a social one as 
well (Fairbairn, 1994). Correspondingly, the development and implementation of 
good corporate governance practice for cooperatives is viewed as still being in its 
early stages (Shaw, 2006).
Cooperatives, like other public and private sector or investor owned firms, 
have not remained untouched by recent scandals that relate to accountability 
and corporate governance, nor by the development of codes of good practice. 
According to Co-operatives UK (2005), the fairly new development of a corporate 
governance code related to relevant performance measures was encouraged by 
external governance scandals and acknowledgment that cooperatives had to 
implement “cutting edge practice in corporate governance” (Co-operatives UK, 
2005). The high demand of governance standards as well as increased account-
ability in different business sectors could not leave the cooperative movement 
untouched. Yet, the development as well as the implementation of both good 
accountability and governance practice for cooperatives remains very much in 
its early stages. The codes adopted by cooperatives so far have been developed 
based on the codes for companies owned by investors (as explained earlier, these 
companies serve a different purpose) normally adding in further provisos con-
cerning membership but not substantively reworking them (Shaw, 2006).
A cooperative’s main aim is to increase its members’ value (professional or 
household) through the members’ use of their facilities, or, in general through 
their operations, and not to achieve and experience profit. Those who create a 
cooperative are looking to serve their own needs in terms of goods and services; 
this means that their main purpose is not to serve people outside the cooperation. 
However, this is not achievable in practice, and transactions with people outside 
the cooperation can be justified, because such transactions can help cooperatives 
to avoid experiencing losses (Kagiamis, 2003).
Having outlined the cooperative movement we now turn our attention to 
some theoretical perspectives which help to highlight issues cooperatives face in 
determining governance structures.
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The cooperative movement – theoretical perspectives
Staatz (1987) identifies areas of conflict and gaps which remain in the theory 
of agricultural cooperation, notably the disagreement between authors such as 
Cotterill (1987) and Lopez and Spreen (1985), who view the cooperative as a sepa-
rate firm maximising a single objective, and other academics, who view coop-
eratives as organisations of many individuals with each attempting to pursue 
their own goals (Sexton, 1984; Shaffer, 1987). In terms of gaps, Staatz notes that 
work needs to be done to incorporate uncertainty into the ‘cooperative as a firm’ 
model and ‘coalition’ models, as well as the more recent ‘cooperative as a nexus 
of contracts’ model.
Shaw (2006) provides an excellent and comprehensive overview of corporate 
governance issues in the cooperative business context. Shaw notes that good 
governance has been embraced as a vital organ in achieving the United Nations 
Millennium Development Goals for sustainability and as a precondition of sus-
tainable economic growth. Also, that good governance standards allow better 
access to external finance, lower cost of capital and lead to better firm perfor-
mance. And that, although much recognition has been given to the corporate 
governance agenda, little attention has been given to cooperative sectors and, 
consequently, the governance challenges of cooperative sectors remain largely 
unexplored.
Mazzarol et al. (2011) developed a conceptual framework that future research 
could use in the effort to create a business model for cooperatives and their sus-
tainability (Figure 10.1). Cooperative enterprises are often seen as unique busi-
ness models. Mazzarol examines them from three perspectives; namely, from 
a member’s perspective, as a business entity and at the broader systems level. 
Mazzerol outlines key units of analysis for every level and takes into considera-
tion three main needs of the cooperative within the model. These needs are:
1  to build identity, 
2 to build social capital and 
3 to build sustainability. 
The application of resilient architecture to facilitate the understanding of 
the dynamic behaviour of cooperative enterprises over time is also considered 
(Mazzarol et al., 2011). The work of Mazzarol et al. (2011) is definitive as it adds 
significant knowledge to the understanding of the cooperative enterprise by 
viewing it as a complex system that must be comprehended on several levels, 
with economic and social outputs defining its special character, which in turn 
requires a multi-disciplinary business model research approach.
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Figure 10.1: Conceptual framework of cooperative enterprise research (Mazzarol et al., 2011:7)
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  Cooperatives, social capital and performance
As already mentioned, cooperatives’ main (but not exclusive) aim is to serve its 
members in terms of their economic needs. However, cooperatives can also serve 
an educational aim. The importance of education through cooperatives made 
its appearance during the age of the Rochdale Pioneers; with the memorandum 
of association stating that 2.5% of the cooperative’s surplus should be spent for 
educational purposes. The leading members had realized that the lack of knowl-
edge would act as an obstacle to the cooperative’s growth. The fifth cooperative 
principle (provision of education, training and information) which, as already 
mentioned before is internationally recognized and aims to broaden each coop-
erative’s educational impact on its members, can only be successful through the 
creation of a cooperative ideal and principles.
It should also be noted that their educational aims can target enhancement of 
their members’ educational level on operating related issues or on culture. For 
this reason, in Germany, even though the cooperatives’ principles refer only to 
the economic benefits, it is clear that they can develop not only educational but 
also recreation benefits, which add value to the community.
Through cooperatives, and of course though family businesses, small 
economies have the chance of creating a common enterprise system that will 
enable them to avoid their exploitation by those corporations that are financially 
superior. In this way, cooperatives prevent the marginalization of weaker social 
groups, contribute to the fight against inequality and help in the accomplishment 
of social equality (Kagiamis, 2003). Cooperatives and family businesses however, 
do not create only social cohesion but also help in the following ways:
  The participation and operation of cooperatives and family businesses in the 
market boosts economic democracy.
  Such types of organisation increase solidarity (within the economic environ-
ment), which in turn contributes to increasing public support in favour of 
solidarity and mutual aid.
  Participating in cooperatives helps people to improve their social skills as 
well as developing their personality, which is very important, especially if 
we consider that cooperatives’ members could come from any social level/
background.
  The participation of certain types of cooperatives or family businesses in the 
market, e.g. in agriculture, contributes to the achievement of lower prices than 
those that could be charged without their participation. It is worth noting 
that this is due to the cooperatives’ operating system (or to the way family 
businesses operate) and not to the pricing policy itself. In the case of coopera-
tives, middlemen are not present, which benefits not only the members of the 
cooperatives, but also society.
One could argue that due to the different structure and nature of cooperatives, it 
is difficult to measure their social and/or economic impact. However, there have 
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been efforts to capture the impact these types of organisation have. In an effort 
to identify the impact of Ugandan cooperative societies, Kyazze et al. (2017), 
linked their performance to their corporate governance, by investigating how 
monitoring rights, ratification of management decisions, innovation and policy 
compliance affect their social performance. Karthikeyan (2013) tried to measure 
the social performance of cooperative unions, using as a case study a farmers’ 
cooperative in Ethiopia. By sending out questionnaires to the members of the 
cooperative, its employees and to the community it was serving, he concluded 
that the cooperative was a successful case and suggested that it could constitute 
a paradigm, as other cooperatives could also be successful by offering social 
benefits. Ruben and Heras (2012) also found a strong correlation between corpo-
rate governance policies and the performance of cooperatives in Ethiopia. This 
implies that if there was a standardization of the evaluation processes of these 
types of organisation in measuring their social impact, then they could more 
easily make a business case.
We now turn our attention to family businesses before moving on to consider 
accountability and governance structures in more detail.
Family businesses
The Institute for Family Business (IFB) estimate that almost 2/3 of UK business 
is family owned, of which 51% are medium-sized enterprises. These businesses 
contribute almost 25% of the UK’s GDP and provide in the region of 36% of UK 
employment. As such it is important to understand what constitutes a family 
business and why it is necessary for them to demonstrate good accountability 
and governance to stakeholders and society.
The IFB states a firm is considered a family enterprise, if:
1 The majority of votes are owned by the person or persons who established the 
firm, or those who have acquired the share capital of the firm, or which are in 
the possession of their spouses, parents, child or child’s direct heirs. 
2 The majority of votes may be indirect or direct. 
3 At least one representative of the family or kin is involved in the management 
or  administration of the firm. 
4 Listed companies meet the definition of a family enterprise if the person who 
established, or acquired, the firm (share capital) or their families or descend-
ants possess 25% of the right to vote as mandated by their share capital.
Examples of companies that fall into the family business category include the 
Swire group, which was established in 1816 and is still a family concern. Swire’s 
activities span across several areas including the Cathay Pacific airline, marine 
investments and the property market. One of the UK’s largest construction 
companies, Laine O’Rourke was established in 1967 and remains headed by Ray 
O’Rourke, the founder of the organisation. Laine O’Rourke has been involved in 
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many large public sector projects including the construction of the facilities for 
the 2012 Olympic games held in the UK. Associated British Foods, (manufacturer 
of products such as Kingsmill bread, Patak’s, Twining’s Tea, etc,) is headed by 
George Weston, the third Weston CEO since the company was founded in 1935. 
Established in 1951 as a family business, Stemcor is one of the largest remaining 
steel manufacturers employing more than 1400 people. The majority of Stemcor’s 
shareholding is still held by family members. Arnold Clark, Europe’s largest car 
dealer, remains in the family of its original founder, Glasgow born Arnold Clark 
who received a knighthood for his entrepreneurial activity and contributions to 
society. Other examples include the Bestway cash-and-carry group, which was 
established in 1956 and the Specialist Computer Holdings (SCH Group) founded 
in 1975, both of which still hold family members in senior positions.
Family ownership could either be perceived as an opportunity or as a threat. If 
the controlling family and the company itself can provide reassurance to existent 
and/or potential investors, the fact that a high percentage of the shares are owned 
by a family can add value. There is a high probability that investors (creditors 
and shareholders) will examine in detail such companies before investing in 
them, due to the high risk of exploitation of other shareholders’ rights by the 
controlling family. La Porta et al. (2000) have argued that there have been many 
cases in which family businesses are characterized by poor transparency and 
absence of fairness principles and accountability, which has resulted in the abuse 
of minority controlling shareholders. The key thing that investors are looking for, 
is reassurance that their interests will be addressed among the family ownership 
through an appropriate corporate governance strategy. 
  Family business and social capital
It is believed that family business can form an appropriate environment for the 
development of social capital (Coleman, 1988). According to Bubolz (2001:130) 
“the family is a source, builder and user of social capital”. Family members learn 
how to trust other people (relatives) at a very young age. Family establishes 
moral behaviour and teaches its members coordination and cooperation, as 
well as being able to share (Bubolz, 2001). “Increased reciprocity and exchange 
reinforce the creation and use of social capital that stems from the dynamic fac-
tors of stability, interdependence, interactions, and closure common in families” 
(Arregle et al., 2007:76). 
One of the family’s characteristics is the provision of stability to children (in 
terms of the period/time of influence it has upon its younger members), thus cre-
ating their very first grounds for socialization (Berger and Luckman, 1967), which 
enables family members to understand and enhance values that exist within a 
family. According to Bourdieu (1994:139, cited in Arregle et al., 2007) “this under-
standing facilitates integration, cohesion and survival of the family unit”. As 
already mentioned above, the interaction between family members throughout 
their lives, increases the level of trust and sharing values. This means that within 
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the family environment, its members interact with one another; ideas such as 
solidarity and influence are clearly present. Therefore, unless certain exemptions 
(such as problems in the family environment), family members can learn how to 
operate as part of a team through devotion and generosity (Bourdieu, 1994, cited 
in Arregle et al., 2007). 
It would not be realistic to say that there are no economic motives within the 
family and thus within the family business; family “has a patrimony that unifies 
family members while it simultaneously instils a competitive spirit among mem-
bers” (Arregle et al., 2007:77). This means that the probability of a family business’ 
survival is increased through the enhancement of its social capital, which clearly 
shows how family business can create a powerful form of social capital. 
Organisational model and governance structures
Having considered the uniqueness of cooperatives and family businesses we 
now turn our attention to organisational models and governance structures 
within these entities. We begin by acknowledging that these organisations face 
the same accountability and governance problems and issues that appear in the 
other sectors covered earlier in this book. However, the governance structures 
in cooperatives have to facilitate the unique interaction that occurs between the 
membership and the management. Consider a simplified version of the model of 
cooperative governance, which is reproduced below.  
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Participation Governance Management
Representation Steering
Figure 10.2: Overlaps between participation, governance and executive management. 
Adapted from the version in Mazzarol et al. (2011:16)
The model shows the interaction between members and management 
through the governance structures. In the participation sphere the members 
actively engage with their elected representatives to communicate what they 
need from the organisation. The members’ representatives are then able to, 
through the committees that subsist within the governance sphere, bring these 
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views to the attention of the organisation’s management. Taking account of this 
representation, managers are then, within their own sphere of influence, able to 
steer the organisation according to the needs of its members. When seen like this, 
it becomes clear that the governance structures in cooperatives provide both a 
mechanism of accountability as well as a mechanism through which direction 
can be given to management. This added complexity makes it even more chal-
lenging to effectively theorise the cooperative model of organisation. 
Cornforth (2004) has additionally identified the development of different 
models of accountability and governance, based on the level of ownership rights 
and their exercise by members, defined as (i) the compliance, (ii) partnership, 
(iii) democratic, (iv) stakeholder, (v) co-optation and (vi) ‘rubber stamp’ models 
which to varying degrees are relevant to both cooperatives and family businesses. 
Specific to the sectors under investigation in this chapter, the organisational 
model should preferably be one in which a dedicated and enlightened member-
ship votes for a board which will have responsibility for corporate governance 
and the associated formulation of strategy, policy and procedure, the direction of 
the business and the supervision of the executive management in the best inter-
ests of the membership. The executive management, in turn, carries out the deci-
sions of the board capably but without usurping directorial power and without 
intruding into its policy-making privileges. However, some complications may 
arise with this model. LeVay (1983) notes that membership cannot be assumed 
to be homogeneous; on the contrary it may be heterogeneous, involving many 
individuals or groups with conflicting ideas and interests, making its purpose 
difficult to discern and deliver. The membership may be active or passive so that 
involvement in the affairs of the society may be weak or strong. If it is weak, the 
board may relax its vigilance, fail to monitor the needs of the members and allow 
the executive management to dominate, possibly to the extent of permitting it 
to pursue ends of its own rather than servicing the needs of the membership 
(LeVay, 1983). On the other hand, if it is strong, it may interfere too much with 
the executive management and inhibit or prevent the efficient running of the 
business (Helmberger and Hoos, 1962).
Who governs, board roles and relationships
Having considered organisational and governance structures we now turn 
our attention to ‘who governs’ and how the aforementioned theories can drive 
different board roles. Looking first at who governs and the tensions between 
representative and expert boards, it can be seen that boards have a difficult bal-
ancing act to perform. Taking into consideration the democratic perspective, and 
to some extent the stakeholder theory view, board members should be selected 
primarily for their desire to serve the membership, whereas from a stewardship 
theory view, board members should be selected for their expertise, experience 
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and ability to add value to the enterprise. When examining ‘who governs’, board 
size, diversity and director selection processes, terms of engagement and perfor-
mance evaluation are also important factors to consider. As an example, there 
is a need to balance directorial experience and organisational memory against 
recruiting new member talent that may have the ability to see the enterprise from 
a different perspective and present ideas that are novel, innovative and perfor-
mance enhancing. In terms of board roles, it is important that board members 
participate actively and adopt a debating style that is transparent, enquiring and 
critical. With regard to board relationships with management, boards can benefit 
from the input of their managers by drawing on their professional experience, 
business acumen and associations to augment, inform and, in some cases, test the 
organisational strategy and direction.
Moving on to board roles and their particular emphasis, this is argued by 
Cornforth (2004) to be most evident in the opposition between agency and 
stewardship theories or, as Garrat (1996) has described it, the ‘conformance’ 
versus ‘performance’ role of boards. Again, it can be seen that boards have a 
difficult balancing act to perform. Boards must act in ‘conformance’ to the inter-
est of owners/members while simultaneously working to add strategic decision-
making ‘performance’ value. Boards therefore must determine how much time to 
allocate to each of these potentially conflicting roles, often with emphasis on one 
at the expense of the other.
From a closer examination of Cornforth’s (2004) work, it is clear that boards 
face various important paradoxes in their accountability and governance roles 
(Cornforth, 2001, 2002, 2003). He notes that the different theories discussed 
before, when taken individually, are “rather one dimensional, only illuminating 
a particular aspect of the board’s role2, leading to a demand for integration of 
the insights of these different theories in an effort to develop a new framework 
(either theoretical or conceptual) (Hung, 1998; Tricker, 2000). Cornforth (2004) 
claims that if someone takes into consideration all the different perspectives of 
the theories developed earlier, a new conceptual framework could potentially be 
developed which could enable boards to deal with the complexities/paradoxes 
mentioned earlier on. The framework developed by Cornforth for the contrast 
as well as the comparison of the different theories is provided in Table 10.1. The 
framework enables a comparison of the different theories in terms of whose 
interests they serve, who the board members should be, as well as what the role 
of the board is in each case. 
Lastly, looking at board relationships with management, this, according to 
Cornforth (2004), is viewed quite differently between contrasting theoretical 
perspectives. Agency, democratic and stakeholder perspectives stress boards’ 
need to control and monitor executive management, whereas stewardship theory 
emphasises the role of the board as a partner that collaborates with manage-
ment to improve decision-making. Studies by Sundaramurthy and Lewis (2003) 
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suggest that, when either control or collaboration is overly stressed, there is a 
risk of a separation of responsibilities or ‘groupthink’, respectively. Additionally, 
Kramer (1985) suggests that the relationship between a board and its executive 
management constantly shifts between consensus, difference and disagreement, 
depending on prevailing situations and circumstances. Further, as Mole (2003) 
has pointed out, tension and conflict seem most likely to occur when boards and 
senior managers have different expectations of their respective roles. To counter 
this, both board and executive management each need to know who should be 
doing what and why – essential to this is good bilateral communication.
Table 10.1: A comparison of theoretical perspectives on organisational governance
Theory Interests Board members Board role
Agency 
theory
Owners/members 
and managers have 
different interests
Owners’/members’ 
representatives
Conformance: safeguard owners’ 
interests - oversee management - 
check compliance
Stewardship 
theory
Owners/members 
and managers 
share interests
Experts Improve performance: add value 
to top decisions/strategy - partner/
support management
Resource 
dependency 
theory
Stakeholders and 
organisation have 
different interests
Chosen for 
influence with key 
stakeholders
Boundary spanning: secure 
resources - stakeholder relations - 
external perspective
Stakeholder 
theory
Stakeholders have 
different interests
Stakeholder 
representatives
Political: balance stakeholder needs - 
make policy - control management
Managerial 
hegemony 
theory
Owners/members’ 
and managers have 
different interests
Owners/members’ 
representatives
Symbolic: ratify decisions - give 
legitimacy (managers have real 
power)
Democratic 
perspective
Members/the 
public have 
different interests
Lay/member 
representatives
Political: represent member 
interests - make policy - control 
executive
Having considered various organizational and governance structures and the 
who governs, role of the board and relationships we now turn our attention to 
examples that demonstrate the consequences of poor governance and account-
ability structures and the importance of the public’s trust. 
Scandals and public’s trust
As mentioned earlier in the chapter, cooperatives and family businesses have 
not managed to remain immune from scandals over the years. Scandals within 
family businesses include the Gucci1 case, where family disputes concerning 
murder, madness, glamour and greed were all over the news, as well as the case 
1  http://abcnews.go.com/Entertainment/story?id=115639
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of Dassler Brothers2, who back in 1924 created a shoe company but later, due to 
tension between the brothers, two different brands were created (Adidas and 
Puma). Among the scandals that have led to public’s mistrust of cooperatives 
are: the case of Umbrella Co-op in Angkasa, where there were allegations about 
misuse of funds, the 24 Deposit-Taking Co-ops Scandal, where directors were 
accused of using the cooperative’s funds for their own benefits (to buy land), 
the Malay Officers Cooperative Credit and Investment Society, where the 
cooperative was unable to pay salaries and refund its members. So, can these 
organisations justify the public’s trust in them? The answer is yes. Initiatives can 
be taken to promote the work of these sectors. The impact they have on society 
and communities could be highlighted to increase public’s trust.
One example is the European Confederation of Cooperatives3 (CECOP- 
CICOPA), an association founded in 1979, which highlights the importance 
of industrial and service cooperatives. In one of their recent case studies, they 
indicated what impact the creation of a farming cooperative had in Italy. The 
impact study was not based on numbers and figures; rather the cooperative was 
created with a view to “introduce modern farming methods and new produc-
tive activities to restore dignity and value to people through the creation of a 
social economy, to promote respect for the environment and to develop people’s 
awareness and consumption of local products” (CECOP, 2017). In a world where 
people have started questioning things requiring transparency and increased 
accountability, the way businesses can make their case is through evidence 
of the impact they have on the society. The Committee for the Promotion and 
Advancement of Cooperatives (COPAC) highlights the people-focused nature 
of cooperative enterprises, and emphasises the principles of voluntary and open 
membership which underlie the cooperative movement. It further emphasises 
democratic member control and member economic participation as being essen-
tial features to ensure trust and transparency. These agencies promote and sup-
port cooperatives as they provide a valuable space where all people, regardless 
of race, gender, culture, social background or economic circumstance, can meet 
their needs and build better communities (CECOP, 2017).
With respect to family businesses the owners have an emotional stake as well 
as a financial one invested in the business. The implication of this is that there 
will usually be a preparedness to work through hard times, a desire to make the 
business work and an innovative and entrepreneurial spirit to ensure the growth 
of the business with a view to handing it over to the next generation of the family. 
An example of a successful family owned business that achieved remarkable 
2  http://www.punditarena.com/other-sports/lcairns/dassler-brothers-german-giants-sporting-
equipment/ 
3  It affiliates 26 members in 15 European countries including organizations promoting cooperatives 
and national confederations or federations of cooperatives representing 50,000 enterprises 
employing 1.3 million workers. CECOP it is a sectoral member of Cooperatives Europe, the 
regional organisation of the International Cooperative Alliance (ICA).
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growth and success is the Korean consumer electronics giant Samsung which 
was founded in 1938 by Lee Byung-chul and has grown from its humble begin-
nings to one of the world’s largest electronics providers. Maintaining trust within 
family business requires determination and positive action. The members must 
agree on the business strategies and goals, establish and maintain policies and 
rules regarding working arrangements and compensation plans and act to sus-
tain and build social relations through family retreats or engagement in service 
projects. To aid them in this endeavour they can recruit external support such 
as facilitators or councillors to help manage sensitive aspects of the business. 
Likewise, they can establish a board of directors included in which external 
expert advisors.
Summary
This chapter has considered two economic sectors, cooperatives and family businesses, 
and has outlined how they differ from public and private businesses, which exist to 
produce goods or services in the public interest or to maximise the profits of their 
owners, respectively. In contrast to public and private companies, the main purpose of 
a cooperative is the advancement of its members and not the pursuit of public interest 
or economic gain. Both cooperatives and family businesses face similar governance and 
social accountability problems to other sectors of the economy. Theoretical perspec-
tives, social capital and performance, organizational and governance structures empha-
sise the complexity of establishing good governance and social accountability policy 
and procedures. An analysis and discussion of the perspective of ‘who governs’; board 
roles and board relationships with management; board size and director selection pro-
cesses; the importance of board members’ participation and the input of managers have 
also been examined. There is no one size fits all approach to ensuring good governance 
and social accountability. However, initiatives could be taken to promote the work of 
these sectors. The impact they have on society and communities could be highlighted 
to increase public’s trust.
Discussion questions
1 How do cooperatives and family businesses add value to communities?
2 How can they create social capital out of the money invested in them? 
3 Can cooperatives and family businesses measure their social performance 
and make their business case? 
4 How can cooperatives and family businesses justify the public’s trust in them? 
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